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Summary 
Analysing the role of money for Swedish inflation, we apply a single equation “P-
Star” model and a structural VECM for the period of the late 1980 to the beginning 
of 2005. Against the background of theoretical and empirical considerations, we 
find that money – when measured by the “price gap” or, alternatively, the “money 
overhang” – has a statistically significant impact on future price movements. The 
results suggest that money should play a systematic role in monetary policy making 
in Sweden compared with the status quo.  
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1 Introduction 
After being forced to withdraw from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) in November 1992, the Riksbank’s Governing Board decided in January 
1993 to adopt an explicit “inflation targeting” (IT) regime as from 1995 (Heikensten 
and Vredin (2002), p. 8).1 Since then, the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts have been 
playing an important role in Swedish monetary policy making. In fact, the 
Riksbank’s inflation forecast serves de facto as an “intermediate target” for policy 
making. Interestingly enough, however, economic literature on the inflation 
determining factors in Sweden has been relatively scarce.2 This article attempts to 
provide a contribution to filling this gap by analysing the role of “excess liquidity” 
for Swedish inflation.  
In the last years, a great deal of monetary policy analyses has been based on New 
Keynesian model frameworks, in which money does not play a role in the 
determination of inflation and monetary policy impulses are spread solely via the 
real demand for goods (see, for instance Woodford (1997)). The “economy-without-
money” approach is, however, neither satisfactory from a theoretical point of view, 
nor does it reflect the empirical evidence of the role of money as a leading indicator 
for inflation for a number of countries such as, for instance, the euro area. The 
reluctance to assign a prominent role to money when analysing monetary policy 
impacts on output and prices is actually quite surprising given that there is hardly 
any disagreement among economists as far as Milton Friedman’s famous dictum is 
concerned, namely that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon”.3  
                                                                          
1  For a detailed discussion of how IT was put into practise in Sweden, see Svensson (1999, 2001). 
More generally on IT, see also Baltensperger (2000); Bernanke et. al. (1999). 
2  For the period ranging from 1972 to 1995 Baumgartner et al. (2003) showed that narrow money 
M0 was a powerful leading indicator for Swedish inflation and that broadly defined money M3 
as well as inflation expectations had significant predictive information for inflation: “Both 
monetary aggregates contain information about inflation sufficiently far into the future to allow 
the policymakers to respond to this information in a meaningful way” (p. 14). 
3  Milton Friedman’s and his associates’ “monetarism” emphasised the importance of assigning an 
important role to monetary developments for prices and the economy more broadly (Friedman 
(1956, 1960); Brunner (1968); Brunner and Meltzer (1972)).   
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The empirical evidence for Sweden for the period Q1 87 to Q1 05 suggests that 
excess liquidity, as measured by the ”P-star” approach, has as statistically significant 
impact on inflation. The results indicate that money might have to play a (more) 
prominent role in the Riksbank’s policy making compared to the status quo. 
Especially so as measures of the price gap appear to support forward looking 
information, supporting a monetary policy that tries to prevent rather than react to 
actual inflation. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In a first step, the 
theoretical framework of measures of excess liquidity will be outlined (2.). 
Thereafter, an empirically estimable inflation equation will be set up and the results 
for the period Q1 87 to Q1 05 will be presented (3.). The article concludes with a 
summary and conclusions (4.).  
2 Measures of “excess liquidity”  
In the following, two measures of excess liquidity will be discussed briefly: (i) the P-
star model and (ii) the “monetary overhang”.  
2.1 The P-star model 
The P-star model has become a prominent approach for calculating “excess 
liquidity”. It rests on the well-known “transaction equation” which can be written as 
follows:  
PYVM ⋅=⋅ ,    (1)  
where M is the stock of money, V the velocity of money, Y real output and P price 
level. Equation (1) simply says that the stock of money, multiplied by the number of 
times a money unit is used for financing purposes, equals the real output valued 
with its price level. Taking logarithms, equation (1) can easily be written as:  
pyvm +=+ .         (2)  
Now let us turn to the “P-star” model (Hallman, Porter and Small (1991)). To start 
with, the actual price level is simply:  
yvmp −+= .         (3)  
The long-term price level can be formalised as:  
*** yvmp −+= ,         (4)  
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whereas asterisks represent the long-run or equilibrium values. The difference 
between equations (4) and (3) is the so-called price gap:  
*)()*(* yyvvpp −+−=− .        (5)  
The price gap consists of (i) the “liquidity gap” )*( vv −  and (ii) the “output gap” 
*)( yy − .4 The left hand side of (5) can be interpreted as the “real money gap” with 
the sign reversed. Real money is defined as actual money supply less actual price 
level (Gerdesmeier, Polleit (2005)):  
pmmreal −= .         (6a)  
The real equilibrium real money holding is:  
** pmmreal −= .         (6b)   
The difference between (6b) and (6a) is the “real money gap”:  
pppmpmmm realreal +−=−−−=− *)(*)(* .     (6c)  
In the empirical part, we approximate v* and y*. This will be done by applying the 
Hodrick-Prescott-Filter (HP-Filter), which has become a standard procedure in 
many applied econometric work (Orr, Edey and Kennedy (1995), Martins and 
Scarpetta (1999)), to v and y.  
2.2 The “money overhang”  
The money overhang, tε , is the relative difference between the (log) money stock 
and money demand (Tödter (2002)):  
t
d
tt mm ε+=  ,         (7)  
where tm  is the outstanding stock of money and dtm  is the demand for money. It is 
an indicator of disequilibria on the money market, expressing the difference 
between the existing money holdings and the demand for money holdings resulting 
from the current economic situation (measured by current y and i). If the money 
demand function forms a stable cointegration relationship, the monetary overhang 
is a stationary variable (error correction term) which contains information on the 
future development of the money stock and/or price level – and may thereby 
                                                                          
4  For an extension of the model for small and open economies (especially in view of fixed 
exchange rates) see Clemens and Tatom (1994). 
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qualify as an inflation indicator. This measure of excess liquidity will be used in the 
cointegration analysis in part 3 of the paper.  
3  Estimating Swedish inflation  
In the following, (i) the theoretical model of inflation determination is set up and (ii) 
alternative specifications are tested for two periods, namely Q1 87 to Q4 00 and Q1 
87 to Q1 05.  
3.1 Inflation determination 
Following the approach of Gerlach and Svensson (2003), inflation in period t, 1+tπ , 
shall be determined by the following function:  
112
*
1,11 )(ˆ ++++ ++−+= tttte ttt zpp εββππ ,      (8)  
where e tt ,1+π  denotes inflation expectations in t for period t+1 (which will be 
specified below), tz  is any exogenous variable taking into account “cost push” 
factors (such as, for instance, oil price, exchange rate and unemployment  changes), 
and tε  is the (i.i.d.) white noise term.  
The model assumes that future inflation does not only depend on past inflation, tπ , 
but also on the central bank’s “implicit” inflation objective in period t, tπˆ :  
)ˆ(ˆ 1,1 ttt
e
tt ππαππ π −+= ++ .        (9)  
Equation would suggest an adaptive expectation model, in which past target 
deviations influence expected inflation. The underlying idea is to take into account 
the period of disinflation in the 1980s, in which central banks across Europe aimed 
at bringing inflation lower in a gradual fashion; and monetary policy’s views about 
the “acceptable” level of inflation should have had an important bearing on inflation 
expectations. After being forced to withdraw from the ERM, the Riksbank decided 
in January 1993 to adopt an explicit “inflation targeting” (IT) regime (Heikensten 
and Vredin (2002), p. 8).5 Applying a somewhat simpler approach than Gerlach and 
Svensson (2001), the Riksbank’s (implicit) inflation target was approximated by a 
linear trend for Swedish inflation in the period Q1 81 to Q4 94, and, as from Q1 95 
                                                                          
5  After allowing for a “transition period”, the framework became operational only from 1995 
onwards.  
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onwards, set at the Riksbank’s inflation target of 2.0 percent.  
Future inflation is determined by expected inflation: e ttt ,11 ++ = ππ . Using equations 
(7) and (8), an estimable equation for the deviation between actual and target 
inflation is:  
11
**
11 )()()ˆ(ˆ ++++ ++−+−+−=− ttzttyttmtttt zayyappaa εππππ π   (10)  
where the output gap is added among the explanatory variables in order to compare 
its information content with that of the excess money.  
3.2 Single equation estimation results 
Table 1 (a) shows the result of a simple AR inflation estimation (benchmark model) for 
the periods Q1 87 to Q1 05 and Q1 87 to Q4 00. A shorter sample period was 
chosen to identify changes in the relationship following the “9/11” effect. The 
difference between actual inflation and the central bank’s inflation objective enters 
the equation with a time lag of one quarter. DUM represent dummy variables which 
take the value of zero except 1 the first quarter of 1990, 1991 and 1992, respectively, 
allowing for the effects of exchange rate turbulences in the ERM. The equation 
accounts for 53% and 57%, respectively, of the variance of the variable to be 
explained.  
Table 1 (b) shows the results of a “richer” specified inflation estimate. The price gap 
on the basis of M3 as well as (lagged) changes in the oil price (∆oil), exchange rate 
(∆exsek), wages (∆w) and unemployment (∆u) prove to be statistically significant for 
explaining inflation in both time periods considered.6 The output gap, however, 
does not have any explanatory power according to standard statistical tests.  
Table 1 (c) shows the results of using the price gap on the basis of the stock of M3-
extended. In contrast to the output gap, the price gap, which enters the equation 
with a time lag of two quarters, has a statistically significant explanatory power for 
explaining inflation. The estimates appear to be stable for both time periods, that is 
                                                                          
6  In this paper we focus on the more „broadly defined“ money aggregates which tend to be less 
strongly affected by (temporary) non-banks’ portfolio shifts. Moreover, the results in Table 1 are 
based on a version of a backward-looking specification of the Phillips curve relation which is still 
used by some empirical workers – although we acknowledge a potential lack of micro foundation. 
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the after “9/11” period does not seem to have altered the long-run relation between 
the variables under review.  
Tab. 1. – Results of estimates for inflation deviations (m – p – y* HP-filtered) 
 No. of 
Lags 
(a) AR model (b) M3 price gap (c) M3-extended 
price gap 
 
Variable 
 Q1 1987 
– 
Q1 2005
Q1 1987 
– 
Q4 2000
Q1 1987 
–  
Q1 2005
Q1 1987 
–  
Q4 2000
Q1 1987 
– 
Q1 2005 
Q1 1987 
– 
Q4 2000 
aπ -1 0.363** 
(0.085) 
0.342**
(0.009) 
0.339** 
(0.074) 
0.3740** 
(0.081) 
0.407** 
(0.075) 
0.449** 
(0.078) 
am -2    
 
 0.051** 
(0.022) 
0.061* 
(0.023) 
 -3   0.077** 
(0.031) 
0.072* 
(0.033) 
  
∆oil 0   0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.012** 
(0.004) 
0.014** 
(0.004) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
∆exsek -1   0.034** 
(0.009) 
0.034** 
(0.001) 
0.029* 
(0.009) 
0.024* 
(0.011) 
 -2     -0.023* 
(0.009) 
-0.035* 
(0.011) 
∆w -1     0.184** 
(0.073) 
0.143* 
(0.084) 
∆u -1   0.008* 
(0.001) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
  
∆u -2     -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
DUM901 0 0.025* 
(0.005) 
0.025** 
(0.005) 
0.026** 
(0.004) 
0.026** 
(0.004) 
0.025** 
(0.004) 
0.024* 
(0.004) 
DUM911 0 0.018** 
(0.005) 
0.039* 
(0.005) 
0.043** 
(0.005) 
0.004**
(0.006) 
0.029** 
(0.005) 
0.029** 
(0.005) 
DUM921 0 -0.020*
(0.005) 
-0.020**
(0.005) 
-0.018* 
(0.005) 
-0.017**
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.015** 
(0.005) 
R2  0.531 0.574 0.675 0.7096 0.738 0.791 
SEE  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
DW  2.210 2.237 2.101 2.010 2.035 1.875 
Diagnostic tests (p-
values): 
       
Q-statistic (4 
quarters) 
 7.30 
[.12] 
4.25 
[.37] 
3.34 
[.50] 
2.69 
[.61] 
2.99 
[.56] 
1.31 
[.86] 
Normality  10.5 
[.01] 
6.85 
[.03] 
0.44 
[.80] 
1.21 
[.55] 
0.61 
[.74] 
0.41 
[.81] 
ARCH (4 quarters)  0.38 
[.82] 
0.29 
[.88] 
1.06 
[.39] 
0.63 
[.77] 
3.67 
[.09] 
0.31 
[.86] 
White  0.19 
[.96] 
0.22 
[.94] 
0.76 
[.69] 
0.89 
[.56] 
0.60 
[.87] 
0.79 
[.68] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. – */** denotes significance at the 5%/1% level. – 
Constant not shown. – T = 73 (56). Legend: πa  is the deviation of actual from desired 
inflation, ma  is the price gap, oil is the change in the oil price (US$ per barrel), exsek is the 
exchange rate, w is wages u is unemployment, and ∆ is the first difference of log levels. 
DUM is a dummy variable.  
 
Admittedly, the identification of the long-run equilibrium value for income velocity 
by using the HP-Filter is just one among many other procedures. What is more, 
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using the HP-Filter might not necessarily solve the non-stationarity problem 
(Nelson and Kang (1981)). As a measures of “cross-checking”, Table 2 shows the 
estimation results based on the price gaps which calculated by first differences 
rather than filtering.  
Tab. 2. – Results of estimates for inflation deviations (m – p – y* in first differences)  
 No. of 
Lags 
(a) AR model (b) M3 price gap (c) M3-extended 
price gap 
 
Variable 
 Q1 1987 
– 
Q1 2005
Q1 1987 
– 
Q4 2000
Q1 1987 
– 
Q1 2005
Q1 1987 
– 
Q4 2000
Q1 1987 
– 
Q1 2005 
Q1 1987 
– 
Q4 2000 
aπ -1 0.363** 
(0.085) 
0.342**
(0.009) 
0.320** 
(0.071) 
0.361* 
(0.077) 
0.362** 
(0.077) 
0.379** 
(0.085) 
am -1   0.071**
(0.029) 
0.086**
(0.032) 
0.035 
(0.029) 
0.035 
(0.037) 
∆oil 0   0.010**
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
 
∆exsek -1   0.033** 
(0.008) 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
0.034** 
(0.008) 
 
 -2     -0.023** 
(0.009) 
 
∆w -1   0.124* 
(0.071) 
   
∆u 0    0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.005) 
 -1   0.010**
(0.005) 
   
∆u -2   -0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.016**
(0.005) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.016** 
(0.005) 
DUM901 0 0.025** 
(0.005) 
0.025** 
(0.005) 
0.025**
(0.004) 
0.026** 
(0.005) 
0.026** 
(0.004) 
0.025** 
(0.005) 
DUM911 0 0.018** 
(0.005) 
0.039**
(0.005) 
0.038**
(0.006) 
0.037**
(0.006) 
0.040** 
(0.006) 
0.037** 
(0.006) 
DUM921 0 -0.020**
(0.005) 
-0.020**
(0.005) 
-0.013**
(0.004) 
-0.013**
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.017** 
(0.005) 
R2  0.531 0.574 0.717 0.743 0.701 0.734 
SEE  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
DW  2.210 2.237 2.145 2.051 2.147 2.020 
Diagnostic tests (p-
values): 
       
Q-statistic (4 
quarters) 
 7.30 
[.12] 
4.25 
[.37] 
5.00 
[.29] 
3.19 
[.53] 
4.29 
[.37] 
2.96 
[.56] 
Normality  10.5 
[.01] 
6.85 
[.03] 
1.24 
[.54] 
0.96 
[.62] 
0.73 
[.69] 
0.21 
[.89] 
ARCH (4 quarters)  0.38 
[.82] 
0.29 
[.88] 
0.53 
[.71] 
0.37 
[.83] 
0.69 
[.59] 
0.22 
[.92] 
White  0.19 
[.96] 
0.22 
[.94] 
1.03 
[.44] 
1.96 
[.05] 
1.68 
[.07] 
0.66 
[.80] 
Note: For a list of variable definitions and abbreviations seeLegend: See Table 1.  
Whereas the price gap on the basis of M3 maintains its explanatory power for 
deviations of actual from desired inflation, the price gaps on the basis of M3 
extended do no longer show statistically significant coefficients. Quarterly changes 
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(“noise”) in M3 extended price gap are well above the level of the M3 price gap. 
These results might therefore suggest that trend changes rather than “noisy” short-
term fluctuations in the stock of money, or the price gap, contain information about 
forthcoming risks to price stability (Neumann and Greiber (2004)).7  
3.3 Structural VECM estimation results 
To analyse the role of the money overhang for price movements in Sweden, a 
structural vector error correction model (S-VECM) in the tradition of Johansen 
(1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1992) was applied. It is assumed that – as 
expressed by the first vector – a linear combination exists between real M3 holdings 
( tt pm − ), real GDP ( ty ) and real stock returns ( tst∆ ). Moreover, the system 
suggests that – shown by the second vector – that the following relations hold 
jointly: Fisher parity (that is a linear relation between the long-term interest rate 
( longti ) and inflation deviations from target ( atp )), the term structure of interest rates 
(that is a relation between the long- and the short-rate ( shortti )) and a long-run 
relation between stock return and bond yields. The Trace-test does not reject the 
null of the existence of one cointegation vector between the variables under review 
(see Appendix A2). Choosing two cointegration vectors, the results for the period 
Q1 87 to Q1 05 is given by equation:  
 














∆
∆
−




−−
−−
=
a
t
t
short
t
long
t
t
tt
t
p
st
i
i
y
pm
X
)12.0()07.0(
)00.0(
)19.0(
)01.0()25.0(
81.0
0
37.0
006.0
0.1
0
09.0
02.0
0
94.0
0
0.1
'βˆ (11) 
Chi-square (2) = 2.97 [0.23]. 
The coefficients of the system appear to have economically plausible magnitudes 
                                                                          
7  In order to make our analysis more robust, it appeared to us useful and necessary to conduct a 
forecasting analysis, i.e. a within-sample forecasting exercise. Since HP-filtering fits our data best, 
we based this exercise on the estimated regression equation Table (1), column (b), sample Q1 
1987-Q1 2005 – and show the variance decomposition. Our forecasting sample starts in 2001 
Q1, since the Swedish stock market peaked in early 2000, followed by a period of considerable 
price correction. The results underline the good forecast properties of our empirical model and 
are available on request. 
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and signs. The empirical results of the ECM-model indicate that money overhangs 
(as captured by the EC-term of the money demand vector) once built up, tend to be 
reduced in the following quarters (for further details see Appendix). What is more, 
the coefficient of the money overhang proves to be statistically significant for 
explaining deviations of actual from target inflation: “excess liquidity” – as measured 
by the “money overhang” – shows up in inflation rather than output growth (see 
Appendix A4).  
4. Summary and conclusions  
Applying a rather simple version of the P-star model to Swedish data from the late 
1980s to the beginning of 2005 suggests that broadly defined money, when 
measured through the concept of the price gap, plays a significant role for 
explaining Swedish inflation. Our findings may thus be seen as a stimulus for further 
work on the question whether money could be assigned a much more important 
role in the Riksbank’s policy making according to the IT concept.  
Under the Riksbank’s IT concept, inflation forecasts serve de facto as the bank’s 
intermediate variable: comparisons between the bank’s desired inflation rate and the 
inflation forecast shall indicate the need for taking action on the part of monetary 
policy. Needless to say that calculating the inflation forecasts is crucial for delivering 
low and stable inflation. Having a significant impact on (future) inflation, a closer 
focus on monetary development may lead to an improvement in inflation 
forecasting and, thus, policy making.  
From a conceptual point of view, inflation forecasting tends to be an “opaque” 
exercise from the point of view of “outsiders”: it is not always obvious which 
variables are included in the projection model; nor is it known how much weight is 
assigned to each variable. So the public’s confidence in the accuracy of the inflation 
projections – and the appropriateness of its policy recommendations – can be 
assumed to hinge de facto on the bank’s credibility, that is the bank’s perceived 
willingness and ability to deliver on its price stability promise.  
It therefore seems questionable whether inflation forecasts themselves further 
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monetary policy transparency and build up central bank credibility. It might well be 
that it works more the other way round: Inflation projections (or forecasts) are only 
reliable if central bank credibility is already in place. A stronger focus on variables 
which exert a reliable influence on the central bank’s target variable – such as 
monetary aggregates – may thus improve the understanding and acceptance of 
inflation forecasts, thereby strengthening the central bank’s stability oriented policy.  
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Appendix 
A1) Data 
The data used in this paper were taken from the Riksbank, Thomson Financials, the Swedish 
Statistics Office and the OECD (via Bloomberg). – All variables were seasonally adjusted using 
Census-X12. – Trend velocity and trend growth were calculated by using the Hodrick-Prescott-
Filter.  
 
 (a) Income velocities of M3 and M3-extendeda (b) Swedish inflation and target inflationb 
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(c) Price gaps M3 and M3-extendedc (d) Output gapd 
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Source: OECD, Thomson Financials, Riksbank, Swedish Statistics Office; own calculations. – aLog nominal GDP minus 
log of the stock of M3 and M3 extended. – bCalculated as the fourth differences of log values. The inflation target was 
approximated by a linear trend for Swedish inflation in the period Q1 81 to Q4 94, and, as from Q1 95 onwards, set at 
the Riksbank’s inflation target of 2.0 percent. – cCalculated as defined in equation (5) of part 2 of this article. – dCalculated 
as log real GDP minus log potential GDP (HP-filtered log real GDP). – Period: 1987-Q1 to 2005-Q1. 
 
A2) Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Unrestricted cointegration rank test (Trace) Unrestricted cointegration rank test (max. eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigen-
value 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
critical 
value Prob.**
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s)
Eigen- 
value 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05  
critical 
value Prob.**
None * 0.452 140.667 117.708 0.0008 None   0.452 43.954  44.497  0.0572
At most 1* 0.3846 96.713 88.8038 0.0119 At most 1   0.384 35.445  38.331  0.1034
At most 2 0.2820 61.268 63.876 0.0813 At most 2  0.282 24.193  32.118  0.3360
At most 3 0.2246 37.074 42.915 0.1698 At most 3  0.224 18.573  25.823  0.3348
At most 4 0.1355 18.501 25.872 0.3112 At most 4  0.1355 10.635  19.387  0.5513
Note: Trend assumption is a linear deterministic trend (restricted). – Lag = 3 quarters. – Variables: Nominal stock money 
M3 extended, deflated by GDP deflator (in logs); real GDP (in logs); 10-year bond yield and 3-month money market rate; 
first quarter change of log stock prices minus first quarter change of log consumer price index (annualised); deviation of 
first quarter change of actual consumer prices from first quarter change of price target level (annualised). – Trace test 
indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level; max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. – 
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. – **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. – Period: 1987-Q1 
to 2005-Q1. 
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A3) VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM-Tests 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Sample: 1987Q1 2005Q1 
Included observations: 73 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  49.99708  0.0605 
2  39.36865  0.3216 
3  46.66328  0.1098 
4  42.53038  0.2104 
Probs from chi-square with 36 df. 
 
A4) Coefficients of the error-correction term of the VECM and  
       test statistics 
Error Correction: tt pm −    ty   longti  shortti   tst∆  atp  
CointEq1 -0.303551 -0.059462 -1.767638  4.711596  22.83854 -25.77990 
 (0.08610) (0.03436)  (2.77829)  (3.05866)  (19.8616)  (10.4909) 
 [-3.52557] [-1.73060] [-0.63623] [ 1.54041] [ 1.14988] [-2.45736] 
       
CointEq2 0.007987 -0.003786 -0.015504 -0.265485  0.233811  0.763649 
 (0.00360) (0.00144)  (0.11629)  (0.12803)  (0.83134)  (0.43911) 
 [ 2.21616] [-2.63217] [-0.13332] [-2.07368] [ 0.28124] [ 1.73907] 
 R-squared 0.449687 0.494321  0.311753  0.487486  0.592800  0.504566 
 Adj. R-squared 0.238028 0.299829  0.047042  0.290365  0.436184  0.314014 
 Sum sq. resids 0.024213 0.003856  25.21109  30.55615  1288.441  359.4667 
 S.E. equation 0.021578 0.008611  0.696296  0.766563  4.977722  2.629224 
 F-statistic 2.124584 2.541598  1.177711  2.473030  3.785063  2.647919 
 Log likelihood 188.8315 255.8918 -64.77660 -71.79489 -208.3641 -161.7694 
 S.D. dependent 0.024720 0.010291  0.713275  0.909976  6.629213  3.174461 
 Determinant resid covariance 
(dof adj.)  5.10E-07     
 Determinant resid covariance  6.66E-08     
 Log likelihood -18.33336     
 Akaike information criterion  4.337900     
 Schwarz criterion  8.730562     
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